Crilly: Recent Developments

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A NASCENT PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING THE
ADVISORY OPINION JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
On December 17, 1982, the U.S. House of Representatives
unanimously adopted a resolution 1 urging the President to consider the feasibility of pursuing, through the United Nations, an
expanded advisory opinion 2 jurisdiction for the International
Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court). Such an expanded jurisdiction
would allow national courts to obtain an advisory "preliminary
opinion" on important questions of international law before making a final decision in a case.
The House resolution recommends that the President consider the establishment of a special committee within the United
Nations which would channel requests from national courts to the
1. H.R. Con. Res. 86, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H10197 (daily ed. Dec. 17,
1982). The text of the resolution is as follows:
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring}, That
(a) the Congress finds that increased utilization of the International Court of Justice
should be encouraged and that one means of increasing utilization of the Court
would be to expand its advisory opinion jurisdiction to include questions of international law referred by national courts.
(b) Therefore, the President is urged to consider the feasibility of pursuing,
through the United Nations, such an expanded advisory opinion jurisdiction for
the International Court of Justice. In such consideration, the President(!) should take into account the Department of State study, prepared in 1976
by the Office of the Legal Advisor, entitled "Widening Access to the International
Court of Justice", which endorsed the idea of providing a procedure through which
national appellate courts could, before rendering judgment in a case, have recourse
to the International Court of Justice for an advisory "preliminary opinion" on
issues of international law; and
(2) should explore the appropriateness of the establishment of a special committee, under United Nations auspices, authorized to seek an advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice, upon request by a national court or tribunal
which is duly authorized by national legislation to make such a request, regarding
any question of international law of which such court or tribunal has jurisdiction.
2. The essence of the International Court of Justice advisory opinions is that, unlike
the Court's judgments in contentious cases, they have no binding effect. Only in a few
specific cases, where it is stipulated beforehand, will an opinion have binding force. Although
advisory opinions are not binding in the formal sense, the substance of the opinion is of the
same high judicial quality as that of judgments. See generally, D. PRATAP, THE ADVISORY
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 227-70 (1972).
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ICJ. The United Nations Charter currently grants authority to
request advisory opinions only to the General Assembly, the
Security Council, and other organs of the United Nations when
authorized by the General Assembly. 3 A national court, of course,
could not make a request for an advisory opinion directly to the
Court, but a U.N. organ, if duly authorized by the General
Assembly, could make such a request on behalf of the national
court. The establishment of a special committee by the General
Assembly would avoid the necessity of revising the U.N. Charter
or the Statute of the ICJ, an undertaking opposed by some
members of the United Nations. 4
The House resolution was backed by the American Bar
Association (ABA) and was based on an ABA proposal for the
adoption of a procedure by which national courts could refer difficult questions of international law to the ICJ. 5 The current ABA
proposal suggests limiting the United States' initial acceptance to
issues relating to interpretation of multilateral and bilateral
treaties, but notes that the expanded advisory opinion jurisdiction
would eventually be appropriate for the entire range of international legal issues. 6

3. U.N. CHARTER art. 96. The Statute of the Court allows it to give an advisory
opinion only to a body authorized by or in accordance with the Charter. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 65, 15 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 355, reprinted in s. ROSENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 61, 87 (2d ed. 1979).
4. See Sohn, Broadening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 125 (1983). Amendments to the U.N. Charter require a vote
of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, including all the permanent
members of the Security Council. U .N. CHARTER art. 108. A resolution establishing a special
committee to channel requests to the Court could be passed with a majority- probably a
two-thirds majority-of the General Assembly. Id. art. 18.
5. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
1982 MIDYEAR MEETING 12 (Chicago 1982). The resolution was based on an October 14, 1981
report of the Committee on International Courts of the Section of International Law and
Practice.
6. Committee on International Courts, Revised Report concerning the Expansion of
the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 1982 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. 4
[hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]. The ABA proposal also recommends that Congress consider including issues that raise the "act of state" doctrine and extraterritorial application
of domestic antitrust laws within the proposed expanded jurisdictional base of the ICJ. Id.
at 5.
The proposal envisages a federal statute to determine which federal courts would be
authorized to submit questions of international law to the ICJ. The option would be
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The ABA proposal is similar to the procedure developed by
the General Assembly in 1955 to allow the Court to receive requests for review of judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of
the United Nations without the necessity of amending the U.N.
Charter. 7 The General Assembly established a Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments to
determine whether such a request should be presented to the
Court. Unlike the Court's opinions under that procedure, however,
the preliminary advisory opinions requested by national courts
would not necessarily be binding. 8
The fact that national courts might disregard the advisory
opinions of the ICJ may have the unpropitious effect of detracting
from the Court's prestige. Such a conflict, however, may not arise
often. 9 The view of the General Assembly and most authorities is
that advisory opinions of the ICJ represent authoritative
statements of international law. 10 The advisory opinions that the
ICJ would provide to national courts would serve, in any event, to
promote a uniform interpretation of international law. 11
There is a general consensus among international legal
scholars that the ICJ has been seriously under-utilized. 12 In 1970,
the General Assembly adopted a resolution to review the role of
available to state legislatures to implement a system for the state courts. The proposal suggests that model uniform legislation could be drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in this regard. Id.
7. G. A. Res. 957, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 30-31, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955). See
also Sohn, supra note 4, at 125-26.
8. For a discussion of the non-binding character of advisory opinions of the Court,
see 2 s. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 744-47 (1965), and
D. PRAT AP. supra note 2, at 254-59.
The ABA proposal emphasizes that there is no intention of establishing a hierarchy of
courts, only a system of cooperation through which the ICJ would assist national courts in
the interpretation of international law. Each country could limit the scope of its acceptance
of the Court's jurisdiction. Should a conflict arise between a rule of international law, as interpretep by the ICJ, and a rule of domestic law, the national court would be free to determine how such a conflict should be resolved. ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12.
9. Id. at 12.
10. Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in 2 THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 499, 507-08 (L. Gross ed. 1976). It is expected that
the proposed "preliminary" advisory opinions would achieve a legal status similar to that of
advisory opinions in general.
11. See Sohn, supra note 4, at 127.
12. See, e.g., Anand, Role of International Adjudication, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1-21 (L. Gross ed. 1976); Gross, The International Court of

Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the International Legal
Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253-75 (1971).
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the Court. 13 A questionnaire returned by member states to the
Secretary-General in response to the resolution indicated the insufficient extent of the use of the Court. 14 A number of states
responded with proposals that the advisory jurisdiction of the
Court should be expanded. 15 The General Assembly later adopted
a resolution which called upon member states to use the Court
more often. 16 Although the Court should not be burdened with
trivial issues, 17 conspicuous inactivity detracts from its prestige. 18
Under the congressional proposal, a number of safeguards exist to
protect the Court from inappropriate, trivial, or politically sensitive cases. The proposed special committee to be created by the
General Assembly would be authorized to screen cases, and to
limit the number of cases based on the docket of the Court. 19 Arti13. G.A. Res. 2723, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 128, U.N. Doc. A/2723 (1970). This
resolution considered the desirability of finding ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Court. The resolution invited member states to submit to the SecretaryGeneral views and suggestions concerning the role of the Court on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by the Secretary-General.
14. U.N. Doc. A/8382, paras. 30-41, at 15-19 (1971) (issued in mimeographed form only).
15. Id. paras. 263-294, 299-305, at 90-101. Responses supporting an expanded advisory opinion jurisdiction were received from: Cyprus, Laos, Denmark, Guatemala, United
States, Argentina, Italy, Finland, Mexico, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada,
Madagascar, Iraq, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Belgium. Id. The French Government opposed
extending the advisory jurisdiction of the Court on the grounds that it was unnecessary and
might lead to circumvention of the principle that no state may be subjected to international
justice without its consent. Id. paras. 295-298, at 99-100.
16. G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 141, U.N. Doc. A/3232 (1974).
17. See M. POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE
LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS 380 & n.27 (1973) (citing address by Edvard Hambro in 1968 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 269, 272).
18. See Szasz, supra note 10, at 510.
19. See Sohn, supra note 4, at 128. For a discussion of the potential role of the proposed U.N. special committee designated to transmit queries to the Court, see Szasz, supra
note 10, at 524-28. The composition and method of selection of the special committee is an
open question at this stage. It would most likely be similar to the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments: That Committee is composed of
the "Member States the representatives of which have served on the General Committee of
the most recent regular session of the General Assembly." Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal art. 11, para. 4, U.N. Doc. AT/11/Rev. 4 (1972). The General Committee, in turn, is
composed of the President and thirteen Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly, and the
chairmen of the seven main committees. These are elected at the beginning of each session
of the General Assembly. The General Committee serves a function similar to a steering
committee for the Assembly. B. KOM, THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 89
(1966). Under article 11, paragraph 1 of the Tribunal's statute, "a Member State, the
Secretary-General or the person in respect of whom a judgment has been rendered" may apply to the Committee on Applications to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ. U.N. Doc.
AT/11/Rev. 4 (1972). See also, supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text. The Court itself
should probably retain a degree of control in determining which questions of international
law it wishes to hear.
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cle 65 of the Statute of the Court makes it clear that the Court has
discretion whether to reply to requests for opinions. 2° Consequently, even if the special committee presented a case to the Court, the
Court could still decline to give an advisory opinion. 21
A U.S. Department of State study in 1976 entitled Widening
Access to the International Court of Justice, strongly endorsed
the proposition that it was desirable to increase the activity, use,
and contribution to international law of the Court. 22 House Concurrent Resolution 86 specifically requests the President to consider
the State Department study when determining the feasibility of
pursuing an expansion of the advisory opinion jurisdiction of the
Court through the United Nations. 23 The study, however, does not
consider the alternative of a special committee of the General
Assembly to channel requests for advisory opinions to the Court.
Rather, the study recommends an amendment to the U .N. Charter
and Statute of the Court to allow national courts to refer questions
of international law directly to the Court for a preliminary advisory opinion. 24
The State Department study points out that the reference
procedure for preliminary advisory opinions would avoid possible
problems for the United States under its Constitution. There
would be no direct appeal by an individual to the ICJ from the
United States Supreme Court, thereby avoiding a foreign
tribunal's superior review and possible reversal of a Supreme
Court decision. In addition, there would be no question of permitting a foreign court to exercise judicial power over U.S. nationals. 25
The State Department study also reaffirms strong support
for strengthening the role of the ICJ and expresses concern over
its relative disuse. The study points out the modern need for
20. The practice of the Court, however, has been to consider itself under a duty to
reply to any valid request for an advisory opinion unless compelling reasons indicate otherwise. See K. KIETH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 142-50 (1970).
21. The process would be similar to the United States Supreme Court's system of
deciding whether to grant a writ of certiorari. See Szasz, supra note 10, at 527-28.
22. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WIDENING ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1976), reprinted in part in 16 l.L.M. 187, 188 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF STATE STUDY].
23. See supra note 1.
24. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STUDY, supra note 22, at 204-05. The study analyzes the
potential for various entities to be afforded access to the Court, including individuals, corporations, public international and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and regional organizations.
25. Id. at 191.
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uniformity in law affecting transn(l.tional activities and the potential
of the Court for meeting this requirement. Overall, the study
favors expanding the jurisdictional capacity of the Court through
the preliminary opinion procedure. 26 The major problem with the
study is that it does not consider the option of a reference procedure via a special committee of the General Assembly, thereby
avoiding the need to amend the U.N. Charter and Statute of the
Court.
The proposed reference procedure from national courts to the
ICJ is analogous to the system in the European Economic Community (EEC) whereby member states' national courts are entitled to ask for preliminary rulings from the European Court of
Justice under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 27 Article 177 empowers the European Court to rule on the interpretation of the
EEC Treaty and acts of Community institutions. 28 The reference
procedure is also analogous to the system of "certification" under
which United States federal courts may obtain an opinion from
state courts on questions of state law.
One aim of the EEC reference procedure is to promote uniformity in the interpretation of community law. For similar reasons,
in respect to international law, Judge Jessup supported the idea of
an expanded advisory opinion jurisdiction for the ICJ .29 Judge
Lachs has also endorsed the proposal, emphasizing that "the national courts would obviously retain full jurisdiction over the
case." 30
Expansion of the advisory opinion jurisdiction would allow the
International Court of Justice to make an even greater contribution
to the development of international law. The plan would further
the Court's objective of promoting unification in the interpreta-

26. Id. at 203-04.
27. Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(effective Jan. 1, 1958). The Treaty is also referred to as the Treaty of Rome.
28. For a discussion of reference procedure under article 177, see Caflisch, Reference
Procedure and the International Court of Justice, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 572, 573-88 (L. Gross, ed. 1976), and Alexander & Grabandt, National
Courts Entitled to Ask Preliminary Rulings Under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty: The
Case Law of the Court of Justice, 19 COMM. MKT. L.R. 413-21 (1982).
29. Gross, Conclusions, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 727,
740, 772 n.83 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
30. Lachs, Problems of the World Court: A Member's Perspective, in 3 NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, POLICY PAPERS 20 (1970), cited in Gross,
Conclusions, supra note 29, at 740, 772 n.84.
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tion and application of international law. Although the proposal is
supported by the ABA, the 1976 Department of State study and
many international legal scholars, it still faces numerous
challenges. 31 Much study of the legal issues raised by the proposal
is still required, particularly in the United Nations.

Stephen R. Crilly
31. The primary opposition will probably be from U.N. member states that anticipate
the proposal would open the door to Court decisions which would be contrary to their national interests.
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